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STATEMENT OF JURISTICTION
On April 13, 2009, the Fourth District Court issued a Decision granting
defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. R. 538. Plaintiff filed a timely Notice of
Appeal from the judgment on May 4, 2009. R. 582-84. This Court has jurisdiction
pursuant to Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
I. Whether the trial court erred in granting Defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment based on a determination that Plaintiff, who was injured when
she slipped and fell on a puddle of water, presented insufficient evidence of the
length of time the puddle was on the floor to show constructive notice.
A.

Standard of Review: This is an appeal from Summary Judgment, which

presents a question of law to the appellate court; the standard of review is one of
correctness, and the court views "the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom
in the light most favorable to the [appellant]." Matheson v. Marbec Investments, LLC,
173 P.3d 199, 201 (Ut. C. A. 2007) (quoting Bowling v. Bullen, 94 P.3d 915, 917 (Utah
2004)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
B.

Preservation of Issue: Plaintiff filed a timely Notice of Appeal (R. 584),

which preserved this error for appeal. Rule 3, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. This
issue was raised in Defendant's motion for summary judgment, Plaintiffs response to

1

Defendant's motion for summary judgment, and Plaintiffs Motion to Reconsider. R.
249, 391, & 565.
II. Whether the trial court erred in granting Defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment when it concluded that a store-owner could not be vicariously
liable for the tortious acts of an independent contractor to whom it delegated the
activity of cleaning the floor.
A.

Standard of Review: This is an appeal from summary judgment, so the

standard of review is one of correctness. The court views facts and reasonable inferences
in the light most favorable to the appellant. Matheson v. Marbec Investments, LLC, 173
P.3d 199, 201 (Utat Ct. App 2007) (quoting Bowling v. Bullen, 94 P.3d 915,917 (Utah
2004)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
B.

Preservation of Issue: Plaintiff filed a timely Notice of Appeal. R. 584.

Rule 3, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Mrs. Price raised this issue in response to
Smith's Motion for Summary Judgment which preserved this issue for appeal. R. 293.
APPLICABLE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
There are no applicable constitutional or statutory provisions in this case.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case stems from a slip-and-fall that happened in a Smith's Food and Drug
Centers, Inc., supermarket (hereinafter "Smith's"). Plaintiff/Appellant, Judy Price,
slipped and fell on a puddle of water and suffered injuries; including a broken arm and a
2

hip injury that requires surgery. Mrs. Price brought several causes of action against
Smith's but appeals only in regard to two of those causes: first, that the store was
negligent when it failed to inspect an area of the store where it had allowed an
independent contractor to work for the day; and second, that the store should be
vicariously liable for the negligence of the independent contractor for causing the
hazardous puddle. The Fourth District Court for the State of Utah granted Smith's
Motion for Summary Judgment on both counts mentioned above concluding as a matter
of law that, under either theory of liability, Mrs. Price would be unable to recover.
The issues before this court are, first, whether Mrs. Price presented sufficient
evidence of the length of time the water was on the floor to establish constructive notice;
and second, whether the store can be vicariously liable for the negligence of an in-store
food demonstrator (independent contractor) for harm to Mrs. Price caused by the
demonstrator's failure to clean up the floor after the demonstration.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On April 2, 2005, Steven Tyler, an employee of a food demonstrator Pyggy, Inc.,
d.b.a. Market Source West., (hereinafter "Pyggy") spent the day handing out meat and
cheese to customers in Smith's American Fork store. R. 248. Pyggy brought its own
demonstration equipment and table, but purchased the food samples from Smith's. R.
247.
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According to Mr. Tyler of Pyggy, he took down his demonstration table at 4:40 in
the afternoon, counted the remaining meat and cheese products, paid for the product
provided by Smith's, and left the store by 5:00 pm. R. 177.
Smith's had a policy that prior to demonstrators like Pyggy leaving the store that
the demonstrator needed to check out with Smith's employees. R. 278.
Smith's does not have a safety policy in place for checking or cleaning a
demonstration area after an in-store demonstration. R. 281. Smith's has a general policy
of checking the floor once an hour. R. 248.
Ms. Price did not dispute allegations by Smith's that they conducted numerous
regular inspections of the entire store at or around the time of her fall. R. 301.
However, no Smith's employee checked or inspected the area of the food
demonstration immediately after Pyggy left to make sure it was clean or free of debris.
R.280,295,299,359.
Shortly after 5:00 pm, Plaintiff Judy Price went to Smith's with her granddaughter
to buy strawberries. R. 250, 303. As she was leaving the produce section of the store
with her strawberries, Ms. Price fell on a puddle of water, breaking her arm and injuring
her hip. R. 298-99. Ms. Price thinks the accident happened after 5:00 pm, around 5:20.
R. 303.
No one knows for sure how the water got onto the floor, or exactly how long it had
been there. Although Mr. Tyler is adamant that he did not have water at his
demonstration table (R. 365-66), Chuck Brown, the store manager for Smith's at the time
of the incident, testified that he was sure the water came from the demonstration table. R.
4

298. Mr. Brown concluded this because Ms. Price fell at the site of the demonstration
table, and because he noticed a cup of water on the demonstration table when he went to
talk to Mr. Tyler earlier in the day. R. 298. Mr. Brown stated he was almost 100% sure
the water came from Mr. Tyler's table. R. 298. There is no other evidence suggesting
any other source of the spilled water. R. 298, 426-27.
Mr. Brown also testified that he thought the water was on the floor for maybe 10
minutes. R. 301,278.
Mr. Brown testified that the water was cleaned up easily with a paper towel. R.
278-279. 1
After the incident in which Ms. Price slipped and fell on the puddle of water,
Pyggy went out of business and was found not to have insurance. Transcript of Oral
Arguments at 25.
Mrs. Price's supermarket safety expert, Kent Steele, opined that demonstration
areas are typical areas to anticipate spillage. R. 254. Mr. Steele also opined that Smith's
conduct fell below the standard of care because Smith's failed to verify that Pyggy left
the demonstration area clean and spill free when Pyggy checked out. R. 252.

Page 45 of Alan Brown's deposition was attached to Mrs. Price's Memorandum in Opposition
to Defendant's Motion for summary Judgment but was not numbered as part of the paginated
record. However, that page of Mr. Borwn's deposition fell between pages 279 and 279 of the
paginated record.
5

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Ordinary Negligence.
The court below dismissed Mrs. Price's claim of ordinary negligence, finding that
she produced insufficient evidence of the amount of time the puddle was on the floor.
Mrs. Price challenges that decision.
Storeowners are required to keep their premises reasonably safe by exercising
reasonable care. A store can be liable for negligence if it had actual or constructive
notice of a dangerous condition and failed to remedy it. Constructive notice can be
imputed to a store if it would have had actual notice had it exercised reasonable care. In
determining whether a defendant had constructive notice of a dangerous condition,
evidence of the time the condition existed is relevant. Nevertheless, there is no formulaic
way to determine what length of time constitutes an abuse of reasonable care. Evidence
of the condition of the dangerous condition as well as circumstances giving rise to
inferences of negligence are also relevant. Therefore, constructive notice can be affected
by the circumstances surrounding and reasonable inferences drawn from a slip and fall.
Nevertheless, not only did Mrs. Price submit evidence of the length of time the
puddle of water was on the floor, but she provided evidence that the length of time was
insignificant to establish constructive notice and a lack of reasonable care. Mrs. Price's
supermarket safety expert, Kent Steele, testified that Smith's conduct fell below the
6

standard of care when it failed to verify that the demonstrator left the demonstration area
clean and spill free when the vendor checked out (i.e., a couple minutes or even seconds
after the vendor checked out would have been too long for the store not to inspect the
demonstration area). Therefore, there are material questions of fact for a jury and
summary judgment was improper. This case should be remanded to the trial court for
further proceedings.
Vicarious Liability.
Although Utah law has long accepted the general rule that the employer of an
independent contractor is not generally liable for the tortious act of the contractor, the
duty of a store to keep its premises reasonably safe is non-delegable. The fact that the
duty of reasonable care is non-delegable does not change the duty in Utah in any way; it
merely means that a store cannot avoid liability for dangerous conditions by delegating
store maintenance to independent contractors.
Smith's delegated the maintenance activity of cleaning the floor at the food
demonstration site to an independent contractor. There is evidence that the independent
contractor was negligent in carrying out the cleaning duty delegated to it. Because
Smith's delegated a store maintenance activity to an independent contractor who was
negligent in carrying out that duty, it can be vicariously liable for the injuries caused by
the independent contractor. Because there is evidence that Plaintiff was injured by the
negligent acts of the independent contractor to whom Smith's had delegated store
maintenance, summary judgment was improper, and the case should be remanded for
further proceedings.
7

ARGUMENT
I. Mrs, Price produced evidence of the length of time the water had been on the
floor prior to her fall and for that reason the trial court improperly granted Smith's
Motion for Summary Judgment.
The trial court ignored evidence of the time the water spill was on the floor.
The job of the court ruling on summary judgment is not to weigh evidence but to
determine if there are material questions of fact that preclude one party from prevailing as
a matter of law. According to the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment "is
proper only when there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). See also Silcox v.
Skaggs, 814 P.2d 623, 623 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) ("[I]ssues become questions of law only
when the facts are undisputed and only one conclusion can be drawn from them.")
(citation omitted).
Therefore, in determining whether summary judgment should be granted, the court
need only determine whether material issues of fact exist that preclude judgment as a
matter of law, not whether certain evidence is weightier than other evidence. Draper City
v. Estate of Fannie Bernardo, 888 P.2d 1097, 1100 (Utah 1995). The appellate court
must evaluate whether, based upon the facts and inferences asserted by the appellant,
there is any law that would entitle her to prevail, in which case summary judgment is
improper. Draper City v. Estate of Fannie Bernardo, 888 P.2d 1097, 1101 (Utah 1995).

8

Because negligence cases, such as this one, are heavily fact and inference
dependent, summary judgment is appropriate in limited circumstances. This Court has
explained that because "negligence cases often require the drawing of inferences from
facts, which is properly done by juries rather than judges, summary judgment is
appropriate in negligence cases only in the clearest instances." Matheson v. Marbec
Investments, LLC, 173 P.3d 199, 201 (Utah Ct. App. 2007) (citations and internal
quotation marks omitted). The appellant is entitled to "all reasonable inferences in
determining whether there is a material issue of fact which precludes summary
judgment." Silcox v. Skaggs, 814 P.2d 623, 625 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (citation omitted).
Store owners are required to keep their premises reasonably safe by exercising
reasonable care. It is a well-established principle of Utah premises law that a property
owner is not an insurer of the safety of his premises, even for business invitees. Martin v.
Safeway, 565 P.2d 1139, 1140 (Utah 1977). Instead, a property-owner is required to use
reasonable care to maintain his store in a reasonably safe condition. Jex v. JRA, Inc., 166
P.3d 655 (Utah Ct. App. 2007), affd, 196 P.3d 576 (Utah 2008).
In explaining the two-part, notice/remedy test of slip-and-fall negligence, the Allen
court said,
[Fjault cannot be imputed to the defendant so that liability results therefrom unless
two conditions are met: (A) that he had knowledge of the condition, that is, either
actual knowledge, or constructive knowledge because the condition had existed
long enough that he should have discovered it; and (B) that after such knowledge,

9

sufficient time elapsed that in the exercise of reasonable care he should have
remedied it.
Allen v. Federated Dairy Farms, Inc., 538 P.2d 175, 176 (Utah 1975).
Here, since it is undisputed that Smith's did not create the water spill in the present
matter, nor did it have actual notice of the water spill (R. 245), this brief discusses
constructive notice as the basis of Smith's liability for ordinary negligence.
The Utah Supreme Court recognizes that even where there are only tenuous facts
about the length of time the dangerous condition existed, the plaintiff can still meet her
burden. Ohlson v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 568 P.2d 753 (Utah 1977) (where the court
affirmed the trial court's determination that the jury could find constructive notice—
evidence of the amount of time the dangerous condition existed—where the only
evidence of the time the dangerous condition existed was the condition of the broken
spaghetti on the floor).
In holding that Plaintiffs negligence claim (based on constructive notice) should
fail, the trial court emphasized the importance of the time factor in determining whether
constructive notice can be imputed to Smith's. R. 534. The trial court quoted the Utah
Supreme Court's decision inJex v. JRA, Inc., 196 P.3d 576, 581 (Utah 2008):
To establish that a temporary condition existed long enough to give a store owner
constructive notice of it, a plaintiff must present evidence that it had been there for
an appreciable time. We have therefore imputed constructive notice to a store
owner only when there is some evidence of the length of time the debris had been
on the floor.
10

The trial court decided that Plaintiffs negligence claim failed because "Plaintiff
has shown no evidence of the length of time the puddle was on the floor." R. 533.
However, the lower court disregarded Mrs. Price's evidence of the length of time the
puddle was on the floor.
Mr. Tyler took his table down at 4:40 in the afternoon, and had left Smith's by
5:00 pm. R. 177. Mrs. Price testified that she fell between 5:00 and 5:20 in the
afternoon. R. 224. Therefore, there is a 40 minute window in which water could have
been on floor.
Mrs. Price also presented evidence of the length of time the water was on the floor
in the form of testimony from Smith's store manager, Mr. Brown.
Mr. Brown based his conclusion on the fact that Mr. Tyler did not take his table
down until 5:00. He testified he thought the water would hav^ been on the floor for 10
minutes:
It couldn't have been too long. Because [Mr. Tyler] left at 5:00 or right before
that, a few minutes. He was scheduled until 5:00. He cleaned up probably right
about that time. So between that time and then when Judy fell, it was probably a
short interval. . . maybe ten minutes, maybe tops, if that.
R. 278.
Because Plaintiff presented evidence of the length of time the water was on the
floor summary judgment was improper and this court should reverse the finding of the
trial court.

11

II. Smith's duty to keep the store in a reasonably safe condition is nondelegable,
and therefore Smith's can be liable for the negligence of the independent contractor
to whom it delegated the duty to clean its floor.

Utah law has long accepted the general rule that the employer of an independent
contractor is not generally liable for the tortious acts of the contractor. Gleason v. Salt
Lake City, 74 P.2d 1225, 1232 (Utah 1937). Nevertheless, there is an exception to this
general rule when an injury is caused "by the nonperformance of an absolute duty owed
by the employer [of the independent contractor] to the complainant." Id. (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). The duty of a store to keep its premises
reasonably safe is a therefore a "nondelegable" duty.
Although Utah cases explaining this principle are rare, it is well settled in
American jurisprudence that a store can be vicariously liable for the tortious acts of an
independent contractor when the safety of a store is at issue. William L. Prosser explains,
in his Handbook of Law of Torts §61 (4th ed. 1971), "It is generally agreed that the
obligation as to the condition of the premises is of such importance that it cannot be
delegated, and that the occupier will be liable for the negligence of an independent
contractor to whom he entrusts maintenance and repair." Id. at 395. Indeed, a
storeowner cannot discharge responsibility for his duty to maintain his store in a
reasonably safe condition by delegating the care of the premises to an independent
Although the court in Gleason used the term "absolute duty," Utah courts in other
decisions have used the term "nondelegable duty." See e.g. Sullivan v. Utah Gas Service
Co., 353 P.2d 465, 466 (Utah 1960); Hogge v. Salt Lake & 0. Ry. Co., 135 P. 585, 589
(Utah 1915); Rose v. Provo City, 67 P.3d 1017, 1022 (Utah Ct. App. 2003).
12

contractor. Lilienthal v. Hastings Clothing Co., 280 P.2d 824, 828 (Cal. App. 1955); see
also Gill v. Krassner, 77A.2d 462, 464 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1950; Thomas E.
Miller, Annotation, Storekeeper's Liability for Personal Injury to Customer Caused by
Independent Contractor's Negligence in Performing Alterations or Repair Work, 96
A.L.R.3d 1213, 1223-25 (1979) (discussion about liability based on vicarious liability
and nondelegable duty). Therefore, a storeowner can exercise reasonable care and still be
vicariously liable for negligent acts of an independent contractor.
Having a nondelegable duty to keep a store reasonably safe is not the same as
being an insurer of the safety of property. It is a well established principle of Utah
premises law that a property owner is not an insurer of the safety of his premises, even
for business invitees. Martin v. Safeway, 565 P.2d 1139, 1140 (Utah 1977). Instead, a
property-owner is required to use reasonable care to maintain his store in a reasonably
safe condition. Jex v. JRA, Inc., 166 P.3d 655 (Utah Ct. App. 2007), affd, 196 P.3d 576
(Utah 2008). The fact that the duty of reasonable care is nondelegable does not change
the duty in any way. It merely means that a store cannot avoid liability for dangerous
conditions by delegating store maintenance to independent contractors. See Gill, 77A.2d
at 464.
A store is liable for the tortious acts of an independent contractor when it delegates
maintenance and repair activities to the contractor. See Prosser at 395. There are many
cases in which storeowners were held liable for the negligent repair activities of
independent contractors. See e.g. Goodman v. Sears Roebuck Co., 129 A.2d 405 (D.C.
1957) (plaintiff fell on temporary covered); Daly v. Bergstedt, 126 N.W.2d 242 (Minn.
13

1964) (plaintiff tripped on masonite molding); Lipman Wolfe & Co. v. Teeples &
Thatcher, Inc., 522 P.2d 467 (Oregon 1974) (plaintiff fell on slippery tile-laying
substance); Bryant v. Sherm's Thunderbird Market, 522 P.2d 1383 (Oregon 1974)
(plaintiff fell in uncovered ditch in supermarket aisle); see also 96 A.L.R.3d 1223-25.
There are also cases dealing with storeowner liability for general maintenance
activities negligently conducted by independent contractors, such as cleaning or waxing
the floor. See e.g. Lilienthal v. Hastings Clothing Co., 280 P.2d 824, 828 (Cal. App.
1955) (plaintiff slipped on newly waxed floor); Gill v. Krassner, 77A.2d 462, 464 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1950) (plaintiff fell on excessively waxed floor); Huddleston v.
Lerman, 73 A.2d 596 (NJ Super 1950) (plaintiff fell on slippery floor); Little v. Butner,
348 P.2d 1022 (Kan. 1960) (plaintiff slipped and fell on meat samples); see also
Annotation, Liability of Proprietor of Store, Office, or Similar Business Premises for Fall
on Floor Made Slippery by Waxing or Oiling, 63 A.L.R.2d 591, 641-42 (1959)
(discussing acts of persons other than employees).
Floor cleaning is a maintenance activity. Black's Law Dictionary defines
maintenance as "the care and work put into property to keep it operating and productive;
general repair and upkeep." Black's Law Dictionary 1139 (9th ed. 2009). The American
Law Institute makes a distinction between repair activities and general maintenance
activities, such as cleaning, mopping, or waxing floors, and discusses them as separate
topics. See 96 A.L.R.3d at 1216, n. 5 ("Not covered herein are cases involving injuries to
a customer caused by negligence in such general maintenance or janitorial procedures as
cleaning, mopping floors, scrubbing walls, and woodwork, or oiling, waxing, or
14

polishing floors.") (emphasis added); cf 96 A.L.R.3d at 1223-25 (discussing a store's
liability for the repair activities of independent contractors) with 63 A.L.R.2d 641-42
(discussing a store's liability for the acts of independent contractors for causing a floor to
be slippery). Cleaning a store's floor clearly falls within the parameters of the general
upkeep of a store and can rightly be considered a maintenance activity.
Here, Smith's delegated its floor cleaning maintenance activity to an independent
contractor by delegating the duty of cleaning the floor of the demonstration area to the
food demonstrator (Mr. Tyler). Chuck Brown, the Smith's manager at the time of Ms.
Price's accident, testified that it was store policy to have the food demonstrator clean up
after the demonstration. R. 281 (deposition of Mr. Brown stating, "Our policy with [food
demonstrators] is that they clean up their area"); see also R. 278. Mr. Brown further
testified that not only was it not store policy to clean up after a demonstration, it was not
general store procedure either. R. 277. Mr. Brown explained that the person who signed
out the food demonstrator would probably have been too busy with customers or produce
to check the demonstration area following the demonstration. R. 277.
There is evidence that the independent contractor was negligent in carrying out the
cleaning duty delegated to him. Mr. Brown testified that the spilled water came from the
food demonstration table, that he saw the water on the table, that the water most likely
got spilled when Mr. Tyler took down the demonstration table, and that there was no
other way for water to have gotten on the floor where it was when Judy Price fell on it.
R. 426-27. Mr. Tyler, in contradiction to Mr. Brown's testimony, testified that he had no
water on his table. R. 365-66. Nevertheless, it is not for the court to weigh the evidence
15

presented to it, but rather, it is a jury's job to determine what evidence it finds more
persuasive. Draper City v. Estate of Fannie Bernardo, 888 P.2d 1097, 1100 (Utah 1995).
Because Smith's delegated a store maintenance activity (cleaning the floor) to an
independent contractor, Smith's can be vicariously liable for the injuries caused by the
negligent acts of the independent contractor.
CONCLUSION
Mrs. Price respectfully requests that the Court reverse the District Court's ruling
granting Smith's Motion for Summary Judgment because evidence was presented about
the length of time the dangerous condition was on the floor, and because Smith's can be
liable for the negligence of their independent contractor. Mrs. Price respectfully requests
that the Court remand this matter to the trial court for further proceedings.
YOUNG, KESTER & PETRO

Tyler S.Young (11325)
YOUNG, KESTER & PETRO
75 South 300 West
Provo, Utah 84601
801-379-0700
Sophie Hayes (12546)
485 East 400 South
Provo, Utah 84606
917-547-9413
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
JUDY PRICE,
DECISION
Plaintiff,
v.
Date: April 13, 2009
Case No. 060401509
Judge Steven L. Hansen
Division 2

SMITH'S FOOD AND DRUG et al.,
Defendants.

The matter before the court is the motion for summary judgment filed by defendant
Smith's Food and Drug ("Smith's") on November 5, 2008, with supporting memorandum.
Plaintiff Judy Price ("Plaintiff') filed an opposition on November 26, 2008. Smith's filed its
reply memorandum on December 9, 2008, along with a motion in limine and supporting
memorandum to strike the report and affidavit of Kent Steele ("Mr. Steele"), Plaintiffs
purported negligence expert. The motion in limine also requested that the court preclude Mr.
Steele from testifying at trial. Plaintiff filed an opposition to the motion in limine on January 9,
2009 and requested oral arguments. Smith's filed a reply on January 22, 2009 and a request to
submit both motions for decision on January 23, 2009. Oral arguments were held on March 2,
2009. The court now issues this decision granting the motion for summary judgment on all four
causes of action alleged by Plaintiff against Smith's. This decision renders moot the motion in
limine, so the court does not discuss it further.
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FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On April 2, 2005, Plaintiff and her granddaughter Judy Chance went to the American
Fork Smith's store. When they were walking from the produce section of the store toward the
check stands, Plaintiff slipped and fell on a water spill that was outside of the produce section but
near the bread aisle. Plaintiff thinks the accident occurred around 5:00 p.m. or shortly thereafter,
and the Smith's store manager, Chuck Brown ("Mr. Brown"), believes that Plaintiff fell at 5:00
p.m. or minutes thereafter. Plaintiff does not know how the water got on the floor, how long it
had been there prior to her fall, or if any of the employees of Smith's knew about the water spill
No employee of Smith's was aware of the water spill prior to Plaintiffs fall. On the day of the
accident, employees had inspected the store floors ten times between 4:24 p.m. and 5:38 p.m.
Mr. Brown stated at his deposition that he was almost certain that the water came from a
demonstrator for Market Source, Stephen Tyler ("Mr. Tyler"), who was demonstrating meats and
cheeses in that general area of the store from 12:00 p.m. to 5:00 p.m. on that day. In his
deposition, Mr. Brown stated that he remembered seeing a cup of water on Mr. Tyler's table at
approximately 4:00 p.m. Mr. Brown also stated that Plaintiff slipped and fell in the area where
Mr. Tyler had been demonstrating before leaving at 5:00 p.m. and there are no other nearby
sources of water where Plaintiff slipped and fell. At his deposition, Mr. Tyler denied having any
water at his table, stressing that it would pose a food safety risk. Mr. Tyler was not an employee
of Smith's, but was a demonstrator for Market Source, wore a Market Source uniform, and was
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compensated by Market Source. Mr. Tyler was not compensated by Smith's. Mr. Brown
testified at his deposition that Smith's checked Mr. Tyler in when he got there and out when he
left by essentially signing paperwork to verify the amount of time Mr. Tyler spent there. In
addition, Mr. Brown testified that, as a matter of course, he would help a demonstrator find an
appropriate area to set up their demonstration and then leave them to do the demonstration.
ANALYSIS
As noted by both parties, Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure governs motions
for summary judgment and establishes that summary judgment shall be granted if the party
shows that "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law." Utah R. Civ. Pro. 56(c) (2008). Paragraph (e) of Rule 56
requires that affidavits made to support or oppose a motion for summary judgment "shall be
made on personal knowledge" and "must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine
issue for trial." Id. at (e).
In determining whether there are genuine issues of material fact presented in the
pleadings and the affidavits, the courts "view the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn
therefrom in the light most favorable to the non-moving party." Matheson v. Marbec
Investments, LLC, 2007 UT App 363, ^[5, 173 P.3d 199 (original quotation marks and citation
omitted).

In addition, the Utah appellate courts have noted that "because negligence cases often

require the drawing of inferences from the facts, which is properly done by juries rather than
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judges, summary judgment is appropriate in negligence cases only in the clearest instances." Id.
(original quotation marks and citation omitted). Applying these standards to this case, the court
concludes that, viewing the facts and the inferences in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, there
are no genuine issues of material fact and Smith's is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
A. Negligence
Plaintiffs ordinary negligence claim against Smith's must fail as a matter of law because
there is no evidence that Smith's or its employees or agents created the dangerous condition, or
that Smith's had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition. The Utah Supreme
Court recently decided Jex v. JRA, Inc., 2008 UT 67, 196 P.3d 576, and clarified Utah premises
liability law. The court explained,
To recover under a temporary unsafe condition theory, a plaintiff must show that (1) the
defendant had knowledge of the condition, that is, either actual knowledge or constructive
knowledge because the condition existed long enough that he should have discovered it;
and (2) after obtaining such knowledge, sufficient time elapsed that in the exercise of
reasonable care he should have remedied it. We have also held that the variant of this
rule is that if the unsafe condition or defect was created by the defendant himself or his
agents or employees, the notice requirement does not apply.
Id. at T| 16 (original quotation marks, brackets, and citations omitted). Plaintiff has not argued,
nor is there any evidence, that Smith's or its employees or agents created the dangerous condition
of water on the floor. Plaintiff also seems to concede that Smith's had no actual knowledge of
the water on the floor, and again, there is no evidence showing that Smith's had actual
knowledge, nor are there any genuine issues of material fact regarding actual knowledge of
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Smith's or its employees.
Plaintiff relies on the imputation of constructive knowledge to Smith's for her negligence
claim. Plaintiff asserts, through her purported expert Mr. Steele, that the failure of Smith's to
check the vendor's area immediately upon his departure warrants the imputation of constructive
notice. However, Plaintiffs interpretation of constructive notice is much broader than the
interpretation given by the Utah Supreme Court in Jex, in which the court explained "the
importance of the time factor" in determining whether constructive notice can be imputed in a
given case. Id. at ^[18. The court further explained,
To establish that a temporary condition existed long enough to give a store owner
constructive notice of it, a plaintiff must present evidence that would show that it had
been there for an appreciable time. We have therefore imputed constructive notice to a
store owner only when there is some evidence of the length of time the debris has been on
the floor.
Id. at TJ19. The court concluded that constructive notice has not been imputed by that court in
cases like Jex, "where there is no evidence regarding the amount of time the unsafe condition has
existed." Id. The court affirmed the holding of the Utah Court of Appeals that "conjecture and
speculation is the only way to determine the length of time the puddle was on the floor, and thus
it would be improper to impute constructive notice to Defendants." Id. at ^[21 (citing Jex v. JRA,
Inc., 2007 UT App 249,1J16, 166 P.3d 655) (original quotation marks omitted).
The lack of evidence regarding the length of time the puddle had been on the floor when
Plaintiff slipped is analogous to that of Jex. The fact that Mr. Steele believes that Smith's should
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have inspected Mr. Tyler's area upon his departure does not overcome the fatal flaw that Plaintiff
has shown no evidence of the length of time the puddle was on the floor. In the absence of any
such evidence, this court is unable to impute constructive notice to Smith's regarding the
presence of the water puddle on the floor. Therefore, Smith's has shown that it is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law on Plaintiffs negligence claim.
B. Negligence-Vicarious Liability
Smith's is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law on Plaintiffs vicarious
liability claim. Plaintiff attempts to bypass the elements of a premises liability case as they have
been established by the Utah appellate courts and create a new test, claiming that Smith's owed
Plaintiff an absolute duty which was breached when Mr. Tyler allegedly spilled his water.
Asserting that Smith's owed an absolute duty to Plaintiff or any of its customers contradicts the
statement made repeatedly by the Utah Supreme Court in the context of slip and fall cases that
"the owner of a business is not a guarantor that his business invitees will not slip and fall[.]" Jex,
2008 UT 67, TJ25 (quoting Schnuphase v. Storehouse Markets, 918 P.2d 476, 478 (Utah 1996));
Long v. Smith Food King Store, 531 P.2d 360, 362 (Utah 1973); Koer v. May/air Markets, 431
P.2d 566 (Utah 1967).
The court in Jex went on to explain that a business owner is nonetheless "charged with
the duty to use reasonable care to maintain the floor of his establishment in a reasonably safe
condition for his patrons." 2008 UT 67, TJ25 (quoting Schnuphase, 918 P.2d at 478). In
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interpreting the extent of this duty, the courts have created the framework described above,
requiring a person who has been injured by a temporary dangerous condition to show (1) that the
store owner had actual or constructive notice of a dangerous condition created by a third party or
that the dangerous condition was created by the store owner herself, her agents or employees; and
(2) that the store owner had sufficient time to remedy the temporary dangerous condition but
failed to do so. Jex, 2008 UT 67, If 16 (citations omitted). Therefore, the only way that Smith's
could be liable for Mr. Tyler's actions is if Mr. Tyler was an agent or employee of Smith's at the
time the accident occurred since it is undisputed that Smith's had no actual or constructive notice
of the water spill.
The undisputed facts establish as a matter of law that Mr. Tyler was neither an employee
nor an agent of Smith's at the time of the accident. In her memorandum in opposition, Plaintiff
conceded for purposes of this motion that Mr. Tyler was not an employee of Smith's and that he
was not compensated by Smith's in any way. However, even if Plaintiff had not conceded this
point, it is clear from the depositions of Mr. Brown and Mr. Tyler that Mr. Tyler was employed
by Market Source at the time of the accident and has never been employed by Smith's. Nor is
there any evidence that Mr. Tyler had apparent or actual authority to act in behalf of Smith's,
thereby becoming its agent.
However, even if Mr. Tyler were Smith's agent, Plaintiff would then have to provide
evidence that Smith's had sufficient time to remedy the temporary dangerous condition but failed
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to do so. As noted above, there is absolutely no evidence regarding the length of time the water
remained on the floor before Plaintiff fell. This case is substantially similar to Lindsay v. Eccles
Hotel Co., 284 P.2d 477 (Utah 1955), and the cases that follow therefrom. As noted by Smith's,
in Lindsay the Utah Supreme Court upheld the trial court's grant of summary judgment in a
premises liability case, explaining that "there was no evidence as to how the water got onto the
floor, by whom it was deposited, exactly when it arrived there or that the defendant had
knowledge of its presence. Under such circumstances, a jury cannot be permitted to speculate
that the defendant was negligent." Id. at 478. Because there is no evidence of how long the
water was on the floor in this case, a jury cannot be permitted to speculate that Smith's was
negligent in failing to remove the water. Therefore, Plaintiffs claim for vicarious liability fails
as a matter of law, and Smith's is entitled to summary judgment.
C. Negligence- Failure to Supervise
Smith's is likewise entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law on Plaintiffs failure
to supervise claim. The same analysis applies here as that regarding the claim for vicarious
liability—the only way that Smith's could be responsible for Mr. Tyler spilling water on the floor
is if Smith's had actual or constructive notice of the spill or if Mr. Tyler were an employee or
agent of Smith's. As discussed above, there is no evidence that Smith's had notice of any kind,
that Mr. Tyler was an employee or agent of Smith's, or how long the water had been on the floor
prior to Plaintiffs accident. Therefore, Plaintiffs claim for negligent supervision must fail as a
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matter of law.
D. Res Ipsa Loquitur
Plaintiffs res ipsa loquitur claim fails as a matter of law. The doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur does not apply in this case. In Walker v. Parish Chemical Co., the Utah Court of
Appeals explained, "[BJecause an instruction on res ipsa loquitur allows a jury to infer
negligence from the type of accident itself, there must be a basis either in common knowledge or
expert testimony that when such an accident occurs, it is more probably than not the result of
negligence." 914 P.2d 1157, 1161 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) (original quotation marks and citation
omitted). Utah appellate courts have established that a slip and fall is not the type of accident
that justifies an inference that it is more probably than not the result of negligence. Indeed, the
Utah Supreme Court has stated that "negligence will not be presumed" in slip and fall cases, Jex,
2008 UT 67, ^26 (citation omitted), and that "[t]he mere proof of injury within a store...does not
raise, without more evidence, an inference that the defendant had control or any notice of the
object causing the injury within the store nor does it presume that he was negligent." Koer, 431
P.2d at 569. Additionally, in Schnuphase, which also concerned a slip and fall accident in a
grocery store, the Utah Supreme Court explained, 'Thousands of accidents occur every day for
which no one is liable in damages, and often no one is to blame, not even the ones who are
injured." 918 P.2d at 479-80 (quoting Martin v. Safeway Stores Inc., 565 P.2d 1139, 1142 (Utah
1980)).
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These cases are directly on point and controlling in this case. In the absence of any
evidence that Smith's or its employees were negligent, the law will not allow an inference of
negligence simply because Plaintiff was injured in the Smith's store. Therefore, the court
concludes, and the case law mandates, that res ipsa loquitur is not applicable in this case and that
Smith's is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law on Plaintiffs res ipsa loquitur claim.
CONCLUSION
The motion for summary judgment is granted. Plaintiff has provided no evidence of the
length of time the puddle of water was on the floor. In the absence of such evidence, the court
cannot impute constructive notice of the water, nor can it allow a jury to speculate that Smith's
negligently failed to remedy the situation in a reasonable amount of time. In addition, because a
slip and fall is not the type of accident that is more probably than not the result of negligence, res
ipsa loquitur does not apply in this case. Therefore, Smith's is entitled to summary judgment on
all claims. Counsel for Smith's shall prepare an appropriate order consistent with this decision
for signature by the court.

DATED this __L3__

day of

, 2009^238!^

Ste<
District CouiiS
Case No. 060401509
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TODD C. HILBIG, No. 8643
STEPHEN F. EDWARDS, No. 10780
MORGAN, MINNOCK, RICE & JAMES, L.C.
Kearns Building, Eighth Floor
136 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 531-7888
Fax number: (801) 531-9732
Attorneys for Defendant Smith's Food and Drug Centers, Inc

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
JUDY M. PRICE,
Plaintiff,

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
AND ORDER OF FINAL JUDGMENT

vs.
SMITH'S FOOD & DRUG CENTERS
INC., an Ohio Corporation, PYGGY, INC.,
a Nevada Corporation, dba MARKET
SOURCE WEST, and JOHN DOES I-V
inclusive,

Civil No.: 060401509

Judge Steven L. Hansen
Defendants.
THIS MATTER was before the Court on March 2, 2009, on the Motion for Summary
Judgment of Smith's Food & Drug Centers, Inc., a Defendant in the above-entitled action, with
Tyler S. Young appearing as attorney for Plaintiff, and Stephen F. Edwards appearing as attorney
for Defendant; and
After reading the Motion for Summary Judgment, the Memoranda in Support Thereof, the
Memorandum in Opposition Thereto, and after oral argument on March 2, 2009, and being fully
advised in the premises and for good cause appearing,

IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that:
1.

The Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby granted on all four

causes of action alleged by Plaintiff against Smith's Food & Drug Centers, Inc. on the grounds set
forth in the Parties' Memoranda and attached pleadings, affidavits, deposition testimony, and other
evidence, on the grounds that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that the Defendant is
entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law as set forth in this Court's Decision of April 13,
2009. Summary Judgment is granted on the following grounds:
a.

There is no evidence Defendant created or had actual or constructive notice
of a water hazard prior to the alleged slip and fall incident.

In order to recover under a temporary unsafe condition theory where the defendant did not
create the dangerous condition, the case of Jex v. JRA, Inc., 196 P.3d 576 (Utah 2008) and other
Utah law require that a plaintiff must show that the defendant had actual or constructive knowledge
of the dangerous condition and that after obtaining such notice, sufficient time elapsed that in the
exercise of reasonable care, the defendant should have remedied the unsafe condition. There is no
evidence that Defendant or its agents created the dangerous condition at issue. There is no
evidence that Defendant had actual notice of the dangerous condition. Constructive notice of the
dangerous condition may not be imputed because there is no evidence regarding the length of time
the dangerous condition had been present prior to Plaintiffs incident.
b.

Plaintiffs claim for vicarious liability fails as a matter of law.

Utah law provides that an owner of a business is not a guarantor that the owner's business
invitees will not slip and fall. In order to recover under a temporary unsafe condition theory where
the defendant did not create the dangerous condition, Utah law requires that a plaintiff must show
that the defendant had actual or constructive knowledge of the dangerous condition and that after
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obtaining such notice, sufficient time elapsed that in the exercise of reasonable care, the defendant
should have remedied the unsafe condition. In the present matter, Defendant did not owe Plaintiff
an absolute duty that could have been breached even if Mr. Stephen Tyler allegedly spilled the
water on which Plaintiff slipped and fell. Mr. Tyler was not an employee or agent of Defendant
but was employed by Market Source. Furthermore, there is no evidence regarding how long the
dangerous condition was present prior to Plaintiffs incident.
c.

Plaintiffs claim for negligent supervision fails as a matter of law.

Plaintiffs negligent supervision cause of action fails because Defendant did not have actual
or constructive notice of the dangerous condition and because Mr. Tyler was not an employee or
agent of Defendant but was employed by Market Source.
d.

Res ipsa loquitur does not apply to this case.

Utah law does not permit the presumption of negligence in slip and fall cases. Utah law
precludes an inference that the defendant had control or any notice of the cause of injury within the
store without more evidence than the mere proof of injury within a store. Therefore, Plaintiffs res
ipsa loquitur cause of action fails as a matter of law, and Defendant is entitled to summary
judgment.
3.

The granting of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is dispositive of the

4.

Plaintiffs Complaint and all causes of action asserted therein are hereby dismissed

case.

with prejudice as to Defendant Smith's Food & Drug Centers, Inc.; and,
5.

Defendant Smith's Food & Drug Centers, Inc. is awarded its costs as are

allowed by law.
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DATED this

^ - d a y ofk^ay, 2009.

APPROVED AS TO FORM:
YOUNG, KESTER & PETRO

Tyler S. Young
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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I hereby certify that on this J}Jl

day of April, 2009,1 caused a true and correct copy of

the foregoing ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT AND ORDER OF FINAL JUDGMENT to be mailed, postage prepaid, to the
following:
Tyler S. Young
YOUNG, KESTER & PETRO
75 South 300 West
Provo,Utah 84601

